The political milieu in the 1950s and 1960s Libya as well as the social historical background of tribal system played a significant role in gaining Colonel Qaddafi a good deal of support in the Libyan society, urban dwellers as well as tribesmen, during the first decade of ruling the country. His Pan-Arabist and National views reflected the national aspiration of the country’s educated youth in the cities of Libya at the time. Moreover, the most significant tribes of the west of Libya(Werfalla, Awlad Suleiman and the clans of the oases of Waddan, Saukna and Huon) offered their loyalty and support as an obligation to keep on with historical alliances between those tribes and the Qadadfa tribe, from where Colonel Qaddafi comes.  This tribal alliance goes as far as the Ottoman era and is known as helf as-saff al fawqi (the upper row pact) it is also known as helf Awlad Suleiman. It was found in the face of the Ottoman oppression and taxation system, as high taxes provoked rebellions all over the province of Tipolitania. “The Ottoman state countered this alliance by rallying its rival, helf saff al-Bahr (the seacoast row pact). Saff al-Bahr included most of the population of the coastal ‘Makhazani‘ towns of the Khums, Zlitan, Misurata, Tajura, and the tribes of Awlad Salim“.[1]

As for the tribes of Cyrenaica, who were known with their open loyalty to the Sanousi, they did not bless the coup that brought down the throne of a man who was seen and remained in their eye as a sacred man. The tribes of Cyrenaica did not like the fact that the person were responsible for overthrowing the king and the ruler of Libya to be, came from a western tribe; neither had they liked his first name. In fact, they were shocked by hearing his first name as the concept of (mu’ammer) is improper and rather offensive in the dialect of most tribes of the Green Mountain. In 1971, one of Cyrenaica tribal chiefs asked the Colonel, publicly, to change his name to Omar so that they could address him or say his name without feeling the embarrassment. Colonel Qaddafi sought to get the support of the tribes of Cyrenaica and his first move came through his marriage from al-Bara’sa tribe, one of the most significant and influential tribes of the Green Mountain.

The Colonel’s policy in eliminating any opposition was to confront it with the public. While the regime managed to marginalise and control the institutions of civic society, tribes remained somehow unmanageable despite the considerable effort made by the regime to contain them.

Although he expressed negative opinion against tribal system, viewing it as both backward and associated with the monarchy’s reactionary practices, he could not do away with it. By contrast, he resorted to this system in attempt to protect his regime and apply a firm control over the society.

Based on his perception of the tribes structure, that the chief and the seniors of each tribe have the moral power over members of their tribes, the Colonel relentlessly resorted to them in applying his measures on the individual.  In 1976, following a students’ uprising at the university of Garyounis and several strikes across the country, he suggested that the tribes were to take the lead in punishing, physically and morally[2], their sons, who were involved, and might get involved in uprisings, sit ins or strikes. He asked the tribes of Benghazi and its suburbs to punish students responsible for the uprising at the university, whether those students belong to those tribes or not.

Having his suggestion rejected completely by the tribes, and as a result of his reservations against the growing opposition and technocratic groups that were striving to gain some political power, he called for founding the Revolutionary Committees everywhere in the country as an alternative means to control the society.[3]

It was evident by 1990s that tribes had grown more unreliable in the Colonel’s eye. Many tribes, in the east as well as in the west, were involved in harbouring and protecting individuals who took part in plotting against the regime (i.e. Islamic Fighting Group in the region of Cyrenaica, from late 1980s to mid 1990s and a coup attempt led by high rank officers belonged to the tribe of Werfalla in the region of Tripolitania in October 1993).

Derived from so called Revolutionary Legitimacy Charter, that gives the Colonel the ultimate right to lay down the law, (legitimises his  diktats and confirms that the directives and resolutions issued by him must be enforced and obeyed without questioning or revision)[4], the Colonel pushed for issuing what he called the “Charter of Honour” in March 1997, a collective punishment code, according to which a criminal’s family, clan or tribe can be stripped of its civil rights and social services for failure to denounce its members’ anti-regime activities. The body to carry out this law were the “Social People’s Leadership”, an institution he launched in 1993 “in order to bring tribal leaders into a single regime-controlled organisation; ‘Social Youth Associations’ played a similar role among the younger generation. The Social People’s Leaderships were tasked with spreading the revolution and countering corruption, deviation and attempts at treasonable conspiracy”.[5]

The idea of founding the Social People’s Leadership was triggered by the noncompliance the Werfalla tribe showed against the Colonel’s request to disown the sons of the tribe who were involved in the above mentioned coup attempt. By contrast, the clans to which those officers belong, declared that executing its sons would be a severe mistake the regime would make and that the support offered by the tribe to the Colonel and his regime would turn into rebellions, seniors of other clans among Werfalla tribe adopted that declaration. As a response, several measures were applied to punish that clan to force it disowning its involved members, including possessions confiscation, houses bulldozing and collective detention of those officers’ families (i.e. wives, children, parents, siblings and cousins). When, eventually, those families surrendered and disowned the mentioned members, the Colonel used this concession as justification to execute the officers and a number of civilians cousins who collaborated.

Another method he used to punish this tribe was to push a rival tribe to do the job on his behalf. As a response to the noncompliance of Werfalla tribe he tried hard to antagonise Misrata against Werfalla, by wakening up a sleeping historical feud between those particular tribes but he was badly let down. Although he managed eventually to tame the Werfalla tribe and have the involved officers executed, he remained distrustful of Werfalla since then.

During the last three decades, the Colonel worked on deviating loyalty more towards his person trying to implant a belief that the state of Libya is reduced in his person and so should people of Libya orientate their loyalty to him rather than the country. While this found interest among only minor proportion of tribesmen, the old in particular, it has, however, deepened an ever growing feeling of estrangement from the regime, the political institutions and from the state altogether among the youth of the country.

When Misrata rose up joining the Libyan intifada in February 2011, which started in the region of Cyrenaica, he worked on reviving the old pledge between the tribes that suited the pre-nation-state structure, in order to turn the intifada into a civil war carried out by tribes. In his late speeches he urged the tribes to encounter the intifada and, out of despair, he addressed the tribe of Werfalla in particular calling them “Awlad Soulba“[6] pleading its members to be faithful to the vow the forefathers’ committed to the Qadadfa tribe. That the sons of Werfalla were to be armed in order to defend his regime, fight on his behalf the rebels whom he labelled “the rats”. The Rats that, in four days, stripped him quarter of his kingdom.

However, the situation in Ben-Walid shows that the young generation don’t recognise the old, worn out pledge nor they see themselves as part of that vow. They share the youth of Libya the state of estrangement from the Colonel’s regime. “The information and communication technologies have provided the individual in Libya an exceptional opportunity to possess the keys that opened his/her eyes on the norms of democracy, civil liberty and human rights, it also provided him/her the chance to develop his/her values and attitudes”[7] which contradict the regimes values and attitude. The predominant feeling of alienation makes the individual in Ben-Walid, as well as the rest of the country,  ready to hear the message of the opposition and more available to respond to the call for revolution.[8] The youth of Werfalla, therefore, assembled in peaceful demonstration announcing support for the intifada and reminding the Colonel that sons of Werfalla are brothers with the sons of Zintan and Misrata and his call for the Werfalla to fight their brothers in Misrata and Zintan would go in one ear and out the other.

For the Colonel, to have Werfalla joining the intifada in the east, is to lose all the alliances he dealt with other tribes and strongly relied on. That means the rapid fall of his throne, which in turn means to ‘capture’ Ben-Walid in order to prove, as part of his delusion, that he still enjoys great support by the biggest tribe in the west of Libya.